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SET AND DRIFT
DOCTRINE MATTERS WHY THE JAPANESE LOST AT MIDWAY
Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, and Anthony P. Tully
Dallas Isom’s article “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” [Naval War
College Review, Summer 2000, pp. 60–100] is laudable for its use of Japanese
sources and for the interesting points it raises. In particular, we applaud Isom’s
interviews with Japanese survivors, which contribute new and useful informa-
tion regarding Japanese aircraft rearmament procedures. This new data is cru-
cial to building an accurate account of the events that transpired aboard the
Japanese carriers on the morning of 4 June 1942. However, in our opinion, Pro-
fessor Isom’s arguments appear to rely too much on a rather rigid (and highly
debatable) interpretation of Japanese communications: namely, exactly when
did Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo received transmissions from scout plane 4,
launched by the cruiser Tone. In addition, while Isom’s rearmament information
(which he puts forward as central to Nagumo’s in-
ability to launch his anticarrier strike before being
fatally attacked) is clearly important to understand-
ing the Japanese side of the battle, we feel that he did
not carry his operational analysis far enough. As a
result, we cannot accept his conclusions.
At the time of Isom’s writing, we were engaged in
a reappraisal and rewriting of the Japanese account
of Midway as a result of our own work in identifying
wreckage from the carrier Kaga.1 A key part of our
approach was to build an accurate model of the op-
erations of the Japanese carrier striking force. As we
will show, the disaster that befell the Japanese carrier
force hinged neither on whether Nagumo received
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Tone 4’s message at 0740 or at 0800, nor on how quickly the armorers in the Japa-
nese hangars could do their work. Rather, the fate of the Japanese Mobile
Striking Force (Kido Butai) revolved around what was happening on its flight
decks. Armed with a knowledge of Japanese carrier doctrine, as well as the oper-
ational information from the battle, one can reach an accurate assessment of the
state of readiness of Nagumo’s force at the time of the climactic American attack
without resorting to Isom’s indirect method.
A major error in the Isom article is that it repeatedly misstates what aircraft
actually were on the Japanese flight decks. In several places, Isom presumes that
the Japanese antiship strike force was on the flight decks when it is demonstrable
that those aircraft were still in their hangars. This presumption carries forward
the (mistaken) conventional view
that the Japanese had spotted their
antiship strike force on the flight
decks shortly after the initial Mid-
way attack force had taken off and
had only briefly moved these antiship strike aircraft below for the purposes of
rearming them or recovering the first-strike wave. As will be shown, this is the
root of the fundamental misunderstanding of circumstances at the time the car-
riers were struck.
In fact, both Japanese doctrine and the operations of the Japanese combat air
patrol (CAP) fighters would have kept the reserve strike planes securely below in
their hangars until they were definitely needed. Not only that, but because of
Japanese hangar design, the window of time necessary to lift, spot, and launch
the aircraft was substantially longer than has been previously understood. As a
result, given the frenetic nature of Japanese CAP operations after about 0800
(particularly aboard Akagi and Kaga), it is unlikely that many of these sec-
ond-wave aircraft were ever spotted on the flight decks before the fatal American
dive-bomber attack commenced at 1020.
This point cannot be overemphasized, because from the conventional belief
of what was on the flight decks flow nearly all Western interpretations of the bat-
tle. To put the matter succinctly, at the time Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu were struck,
their flight decks were more empty than occupied. This is almost the reverse of the
standard view, which has the Japanese flight decks packed with strike aircraft
awaiting takeoff. There were aircraft on deck, but most were CAP fighters, not at-
tack aircraft. There were also fewer aircraft on deck than is generally supposed.
Though potentially startling, this is less a “revision” than a correction and careful
restating of the existing historical record. We will show that official Japanese sources
on the battle have been aware of this for some thirty years.
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These errors in both the conventional Western interpretation and Isom’s
article cannot be addressed without first developing a sense of how the Japanese
conducted carrier operations. Unfortunately, standard English-language histo-
ries of the battle of Midway have
not well understood Japanese car-
rier operations. From the common
misperception that Japanese naval
aviation was derivative of Western
(primarily British) practice, Western writers typically believe that the Japanese
carriers of World War II behaved much like their Western counterparts. In fact, they
did not. Japanese carrier operations contained elements of both U.S. Navy and
Royal Navy practices. However, as a result of differences in physical design and
operational doctrine, by the late 1930s Japanese carriers fought in a fashion all
their own. Without understanding these points of divergence, understanding
Nagumo’s actions is likewise impossible.
Before the days of modern angled flight decks, a carrier flight deck could be
doing only one of three things: spotting aircraft, launching aircraft, or recover-
ing aircraft. To this list most American writers would be quick to add “parking
aircraft” and “servicing aircraft.” However, it is important to understand that the
Japanese avoided performing these activities on the flight deck. Japanese carriers
did not use permanent deck parks in the fashion of the U.S. Navy. While tempo-
rary deck parks were established forward of crash barriers during recovery oper-
ations, they acted only as transitional “overflow” mechanisms until returning
aircraft could be moved below decks.2 Furthermore, while the Japanese could
service aircraft on the flight deck (Japanese carriers were equipped with refuel-
ing points around the deck edge, for instance), most fueling occurred in the han-
gars. Likewise, except for arming dive-bomber aircraft, the Japanese serviced
planes in the hangar as well.3
Japanese carrier design is also notable for its use of enclosed hangar decks. In
contrast to U.S. carriers, whose hangars could be opened to the elements by roll-
ing up metal screens along their sides, Japanese hangars were fully enclosed by
storerooms, workshops, and crew spaces, with no natural ventilation. This
meant that aircraft engines were never warmed up below.4 This is in direct con-
trast to American practice, where aircraft commonly were warmed up in the
hangars, brought to deck, and immediately launched. These factors had impor-
tant ramifications during the battle of Midway and imposed severe restrictions
on Japanese operational tempos.
In order to spot a strike force on the flight deck and launch it against the
Americans (assuming it was already armed), Nagumo’s ships had to perform a
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 4 1
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complex series of operations. Some tasks could be done in parallel, some only
sequentially, and each entailed fixed or variable time costs. These included:
• Bringing the aircraft up to the flight deck (sequential: approximately one
minute per plane).5
• Spotting the aircraft, unfolding its wings, and chocking wheels (conducted
mostly in parallel with elevator movements, but five sequential minutes are
added to account for these movements).6
• Warming up engines (sequential: fifteen minutes minimum for the entire
force).7
• In the case of dive-bombers, arming the aircraft (largely concurrent with
engine warmup, but could take as long as twenty minutes).8
• Delivering final briefings to the pilots (again, mostly in parallel with
elevator movements, five sequential minutes minimum for the entire
force).9
• Moving crew to planes and performing final preflight checks (five
minutes).10
• Launching the strike (sequential: fifteen to thirty seconds per plane).11
Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one-plane strike for
launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes
would be required for the launch.12 If the deck spot contained dive-bombers, the
spotting time would be perhaps five to ten minutes longer, because these planes
had to be armed during engine warm up. This timing is directly confirmed in of-
ficial Japanese sources.13 The need to warm up engines on the flight deck, dic-
tated by Japanese hangar design, reveals itself as a major hindrance to Japanese
operational tempos. Unfortunately, warm-up could not be shortened—aircraft
casualties were the inevitable outcome of slighting this activity, and needless
losses had to be avoided at all costs.14 Thus, if Nagumo was to attack the Ameri-
can strike force, he needed to find an unbroken forty-five-minute window of op-
portunity on all four flight decks during which to spot and then launch his
strike.15
The final piece of the puzzle is found in the activities of the Japanese combat
air patrol that morning. An examination of Akagi’s flight operations reveals the
basic point:
0430—launch Midway attack force
0445—launch initial combat air patrol (three fighters)
0543—launch CAP (three fighters)
1 4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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0655—launch CAP (three fighters)
0659—recover CAP (three fighters)
0710—launch CAP (five fighters)
0720—recover CAP (one fighter)
0726—recover CAP (one fighter)
0736—recover CAP (three fighters)
0750—recover CAP (two fighters)
0808—launch CAP (three fighters)
0832—launch CAP (four fighters)
0837–0900—recover Midway attack force plus three CAP fighters
0910—recover CAP (one fighter)
0932—launch CAP (five fighters)
0945—launch CAP (three fighters)
0951—recover CAP (two fighters)
1010—recover CAP (three fighters).16
The other carriers were involved in similar activities, albeit at different
times.17 The important point is that recovery operations absolutely required a
clear flight deck aft. Aircraft could not be spotted aft while aircraft were landing,
nor would they usually be spotted aft during fighter takeoff operations.18
This information enables us to appreciate several things. First, it is clear that
Akagi was very busy on the morning of the fourth. The constant American air at-
tacks from 0700 onward necessitated a continuous cycling of the Japanese CAP
fighters above Nagumo’s formation. It was very difficult to find a spot to squeeze
in forty minutes of uninterrupted deck time to spot a strike, let alone launch it.19
This is a crucial realization in determining what was possible aboard the Japa-
nese carriers and in analyzing Nagumo’s decision-making process.
Second, upon closer examination it is apparent that Akagi’s 1010 CAP recov-
ery dictates that there cannot have been many strike planes on its deck when it
was fatally bombed at 1025. Fifteen minutes would not have been sufficient time
to bring its twenty-plane strike to the flight deck, let alone spot them, brief the
pilots, and warm up engines.20 Thus, the common belief that the American
dive-bomber attack found the Japanese flight decks practically chock-a-block
with strike planes revved up and waiting to take off is clearly untrue. The aircraft
on deck were primarily CAP fighters.
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 4 3
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As it turns out, this latter observation, while perhaps shocking to an
American audience steeped in the popular lore of this battle, is directly sup-
ported by official Japanese sources. In Japan, a clearer picture of Japanese Mid-
way operations began emerging in the 1970s, with the publication of the official
Japanese war histories (known as
Senshi Sosho) and other substan-
tive works. Unfortunately, it is
only very recently that some of
these works have been translated
into English. Senshi Sosho explic-
itly states that at the time of the attack, every Japanese carrier had its attack air-
craft in the hangars; the only aircraft on deck were either CAP fighters or, in the
case of Soryu, strike force escort fighters that were being launched to augment
the CAP.21
Third, this operational information casts doubt on whether Nagumo’s re-
serve strike force was ever on deck in the first place. The conventional wisdom
has always been that when Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga’s Midway attack force
was launched, the reserve antiship strike force was immediately brought up to
the flight decks and spotted. In fact, this would be contrary to typical Japanese
operational patterns, which would have preferred to keep the strike in the han-
gars until needed. It is absolutely certain that this force was not on deck during
the 0800–0820 time frame, when Nagumo was making some of his most crucial
decisions. Attacking B-17s photographed the Japanese formation during this
period, and their pictures of Soryu, Hiryu, and Akagi show no strike planes on
deck, only a handful of fighters. This is corroborated by Japanese records that
show the force launching additional CAP fighters during this time.
With this information in hand, we now turn to several of the assertions in
Isom’s article. For instance, regarding Nagumo’s supposedly tardy receipt of
Tone 4’s message and its dire implications for subsequent Japanese preparations,
Isom states (p. 75), “It should thus be apparent that if the rearming operation
was reversed at this point—at 0745—it would not have taken much time to re-
store the torpedoes on half the planes from which they had been removed and
respot all the planes on the flight decks of the two carriers, perhaps only about
thirty minutes.” In light of the need for forty minutes just to respot the strike,
not to mention the time needed to rearm, this gives a grossly optimistic impres-
sion of Nagumo’s chances of launching a strike before Tomonaga’s returning
force would begin to occupy the flight decks at 0837.
Isom later states (p. 77), “Thus, at about 0920 operations to respot the
second-wave strike force on the flight decks could have begun, had the torpedo
planes been rearmed with torpedoes. Had the countermand order been given at
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0745, as the standard scenario holds, the torpedoes almost certainly would have
been restored by 0920.” The ability of the Japanese carriers to begin a respot at
0920, had they been rearmed or not, is highly questionable given the high tempo
of CAP operations and their mo-
nopolization of the flight decks.
At this point in the battle, Japa-
nese records clearly show, the
Japanese were alert to a constant
stream of incoming American
strikes. Until the coast was rea-
sonably clear and his CAP well stocked with fresh fighters to last through the
spotting process, Nagumo cannot have been expected to spot his strike. Akagi’s air
officer (hikocho) in charge of flight operations, Commander Shogo Masuda, as
well as the other experienced air officers around Nagumo (such as Mitsuo
Fuchida and Minoru Genda) could not have helped impressing this point upon
the admiral.
Even more questionable is Isom’s subsequent statement (p. 78) regarding the
state of Carrier Division 1 at 1000. When the attack was over at 1000, “about ten
minutes of work still remained to rearm the last division of Akagi’s torpedo
planes, and even more time was needed for Kaga’s. The torpedo planes that had
been rearmed were brought up to the flight decks, beginning around 0920, but at
least a third remained in the hangar decks at 1000. By 1015, the rearming had
probably been completed on Akagi, and the last torpedo planes were being
brought up and spotted on its flight deck. Had the whole strike force been ready
to go at 1000, it, along with Zero escorts, could have been launched during this
fifteen-minute window between attacks on the Mobile Force.”
This is wrong on several counts. First, we know that Akagi landed a CAP
fighter at 0910 and two more at 0951, meaning that even if there had been strike
aircraft on deck at 0920 (which we think highly unlikely in any case), they had to
have been moved back down into the hangar by 0951. Also, Isom clearly does
not factor in the immutable time costs associated with spotting and engine
warm-up—a “fifteen-minute window between attacks” simply does not suffice.
In fact, in this case Isom also ignores Nagumo’s own estimate that the strike force
would be ready at 1100, although a 1030 takeoff was hoped for, if things went
well. Launching at 1000, though, for all the reasons cited above, was never even
remotely in the cards, and Nagumo knew it.
Furthermore, the assertion that two-thirds of Akagi’s torpedo planes were on
deck at 1000 is clearly wrong. Akagi had landed CAP nine minutes earlier, at
0951, and would do so again at 1010. Isom’s assertion is also directly contradicted
by Senshi Sosho, which states that at the time of the 1025 attack all of Akagi’s
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strike aircraft were in the hangar. This is further corroborated by Richard Best,
lead dive-bomber pilot against Akagi, who states that when he dove for his at-
tack, the only aircraft on deck were Zeros.22
Isom makes a different error regarding rearmament activities aboard Carrier
Division 2 (Hiru and Soryu). He writes (p. 79), “[the strike aircraft] could be re-
armed on the flight deck as well as in the hangar deck. (It appears that only half
of each squadron was lowered to the hangar deck after the 0715 rearming order,
thus saving elevator time.)” Furthermore, he states (p. 80), “Most, if not all, of
those [strike aircraft] had probably been changed back to armor-piercing bombs
by very soon after 0830; at least half of each squadron on Hiryu and Soryu was
already on the flight decks at 0830.”
Again, his statement is at odds with the photographic evidence obtained
between 0800 and 0815, which shows no strike planes whatsoever on either car-
rier’s flight deck. In addition, it is known that Soryu launched CAP at 0710, and
recovered CAP at 0730. Hiryu recovered CAP at 0700 and 0740, launched CAP at
0825, and was recovering CAP again at 0840. Thus even if strike planes had be-
gun to be promptly brought up on Hiryu after the American B-17s departed at
0815, they would have had to be stowed below again by 0840—the window of
opportunity was not long enough to have performed warm-up and launch.
Isom repeats this error later when he states (p. 81), “At 0830, when Nagumo
had to make a decision whether to launch an attack on the American force or
postpone it, we have seen that he had ready no torpedo planes and no Zeros
for escort. But he did have dive-bombers on Hiryu and Soryu available. They
could have been launched fairly quickly.” Again, this is incorrect, as the B-17
photographs and other evidence incontrovertibly demonstrate. The Japanese
dive-bombers were all in their hangars at the time and would have taken another
forty minutes to put into action, even if they had been rearmed.
Isom’s concluding point, and his central thesis (p. 89), “considering how close
[Nagumo] came to launching his attack before being bombed at 1025, every
minute saved could have made a significant difference in the outcome of the
battle,” is shown to be incorrect by the cumulative weight of the evidence at
hand. It was not the inefficiency of Japanese communications (which is debat-
able) that doomed Japanese hopes in the battle but the inefficiency of Japanese
flight operations. Nagumo was nowhere near ready to launch by 1025; in fact, he
had probably barely begun preparations to do so. Even assuming Akagi had be-
gun lifting its strike aircraft to the flight deck immediately after its CAP was re-
covered at 1010, Akagi would not have been ready to launch its strike for forty
minutes more (1050) and could not have gotten it completely airborne before
1100. Kaga was in a slightly better state, having last launched six CAP fighters
1 4 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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at 1000, but it was hampered because of its larger torpedo bomber wing
(twenty-seven aircraft) to lift and spot.
It is no coincidence that after the devastating American attack on the other
three Japanese carriers, Hiryu’s actual operational tempo corresponds very
closely with the hypothetical earlier timetable for Carrier Division 1 we have just
put forth. The flagship of the aggressive Rear
Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi can be presumed to
have launched its own strike as quickly as pos-
sible after the 1022–1027 debacle. Yet in the
event it only managed to get that strike aloft by
1057, directly supporting the idea that its own
deck-spotting activities had barely begun when
the other three carriers were being attacked. In-
deed, if the conventional view were true, planes
should have been quite literally zooming off
Hiryu’s flight deck at 1025 even as its compatri-
ots were struck. Clearly, they were not, and this
point is often overlooked.
The picture that emerges from this analysis
is of a rather conservative admiral operating
within the constraints of 1942 Japanese carrier
doctrine. In contrast to the standard American
accounts that have the Japanese observing the
feeble American attacks (poorly executed and
delivered piecemeal) with a measure of contempt, the operational tempo of
Nagumo’s CAP reveals something rather different. Regardless of whether they
accorded the American attackers much respect in terms of technique, the Japa-
nese command was certainly concerned about the aerial assault, both for its dis-
ruption of the force’s timetable and for the overt danger posed by the attacks
themselves. Upon close reading of the Nagumo report and other Japanese
sources, there is no question that Nagumo and his staff knew the peril they were
in. One good hit on any of the carriers could have disastrous consequences, and
each of the carriers had survived near-misses during the morning.
Considering this, Nagumo probably thought he was playing it safe—keeping
the strike aircraft in the hangars until the worst of the danger was past, keeping
the flight decks clear to support constant CAP operations, and repelling
American attacks with the best weapon available, his fighters. When the at-
tacks abated, he expected to spot a coordinated combined-arms strike force on
the decks of his two carrier divisions and then deliver a crushing blow to his op-
ponent. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their desire to launch an integrated
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 4 7
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attack force from all four flight decks deprived them of flexibility in the face of
the enemy.
Because of the remarkably small cannon-magazine capacities of the Zero
fighter, defensive CAP operations necessitated frequent landing, rearming, and
launching of engaged fighters. Nagumo clearly appreciated the danger in which
he would place his ships during deck spotting of strike force aircraft, in that it
created a window of time during which no additional CAP could be cycled. As a
consequence, his options were more constrained than has been previously un-
derstood—spotting an offensive strike meant hanging his CAP out to dry for
nearly an hour at a time when American attacks were constant. As it was,
Nagumo’s defensive approach very nearly paid off, as only the final American at-
tack delivered telling damage. Indeed, it can be argued that had Nagumo played
it a little safer, by putting additional CAP aloft, he might have saved Akagi, Kaga,
or Soryu from the American dive-bomber attack.23
Japanese carrier doctrine of the time did not specify what to do when sud-
denly faced with an enemy force within the enemy’s striking range while one’s
own armed and fueled aircraft were still in their hangars.24 This was a doctrinal
failing—although in fairness, both the Japanese and Americans were grappling
with this issue. Later in the war, it would have been considered imperative upon
detection of an enemy force to immediately launch as many aircraft as possible
(whatever their armament) against it. If nothing else, this would get the aircraft
out of the hangars, where they presented a dire threat to the carrier itself. Indeed,
by 1944 the Japanese Combined Fleet developed just such a command for the
signal books in the event of a sudden enemy detection.25
In conclusion, we applaud Professor Isom for his efforts in bringing Japanese
sources to the fore of the Midway discussion, as well as his presentation of valu-
able information regarding Japanese rearming procedures. It is also important
to bear in mind that he was laboring under the conventional belief that the
second-wave strike was spotted and ready to launch on the flight decks, rather
than below in the hangars. However, his interpretation of Japanese operations
focuses almost exclusively on what it took to arm an airplane and fails to account
for the fundamentals of how the Japanese got that plane spotted on the flight
deck and then into the air. The article also overlooks the relationship between
defensive CAP activities and the inability to mount offense strikes. Its view of
carrier operations is therefore both limited and at odds with a great deal of what
we know to be true about how Japanese carriers actually fought. Without an ad-
equate appreciation of these factors, a proper assessment of Nagumo’s com-
mand options and performance cannot be constructed.
Editor’s note: Professor Isom responds on pp. 158–63 of this issue.
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NOTE S
1. The authors assisted Nauticos Corporation in
identifying a large section of wreckage from
the Kaga, discovered at a depth of seventeen
thousand feet in September 1999. As a result
of this project, the authors are currently
working on a forthcoming book that will ex-
amine in detail the operations of the four Jap-
anese carriers at Midway, bringing new
Japanese sources to light in the process.
2. The Japanese referred to this process as “con-
tinuous stowage” (renzoku shuyo) and prac-
ticed it from the 1930s onward. From an
unpublished manuscript by Mark Peattie,
tentatively entitled “Sunburst: The Rise of
Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941,” used
by permission of the author; Air Technical
Intelligence Group [hereafter ATIG], Report
2, Bureau of Aeronautics, 1946, p. 2.
3. It should be noted that our comments pertain
to early-war Japanese carrier design and doc-
trine. As such, some of our remarks may, at
first glance, appear to be at variance with
such sources as U.S. Naval Technical Mission
to Japan [hereafter NavTech] Report A-11
(Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1946),
which discusses Japanese naval aviation
equipment and carrier design. However, it
must be remembered that the goal of the
NavTech reports was to gather information
after the war to improve the U.S. Navy’s own
practices. As such, its primary area of interest
was documenting late-war Japanese doctrine
and equipment, rather than chronicling the
development of that doctrine per se. For in-
stance, carriers such as the late-war Unryu-
class (which was a derivative of the original
Hiryu design) did indeed have the ability to
perform more operations on the flight deck
than their predecessors, and by 1944 Japanese
doctrine had evolved to view the flight deck
in a different light. However, it must be re-
membered that these doctrinal changes were
the direct result of battle experience (much of
it negative) gained early in the war at places
such as Midway. As a result, the way Japanese
carriers operated in 1942 was different in cer-
tain respects from the way they operated in
1944.
4. ATIG Report 2, p. 3, and ATIG Report 5, p. 3.
This was due to the inability of the forced-air
ventilation systems used in the hangars to
cope with the exhaust from multiple aircraft.
NavTech Report A-11, p. 9.
5. Aircraft were usually brought to the flight
deck via a single elevator for several reasons.
Japanese aircraft were segregated by type and
stowed in specific portions of both the upper
and lower hangars. Fighters were typically
stowed forward, dive-bombers amidship, and
torpedo bombers aft. Fighter aircraft, requir-
ing shorter runoffs, were sensibly stored for-
ward, where they were also more immediately
accessible. Spotting Akagi’s antiship strike
therefore would have required lifting the tor-
pedo aircraft using the aft elevator, and the
Zeros from the fore. Elevator cycles varied
depending on raw elevator speed and whether
the aircraft was being delivered from the up-
per or lower hangar. Akagi and Kaga’s eleva-
tors were older, slower models requiring
cycles longer than one minute to the lower
hangar, and they therefore took longer to
perform their evolutions than the newer ships
of Carrier Division 2. This was particularly
unfortunate in light of Kaga’s large torpedo
plane squadron.
6. Spotting sometimes required relatively long
lateral deck pushes, though the spotting of
one aircraft could occur as another was being
brought to deck. Nevertheless, a certain
amount of “jockeying” was required during
such operations.
7. Initial engine start-up was accomplished by a
crewman, while air crew were receiving brief-
ings. Detailed information on Japanese take-
off procedures was provided by Mr. Nisohachi
Hyodo, an expert on Japanese aircraft ord-
nance, in a letter to Jon Parshall dated 7 Feb-
ruary 2001.
8. Hyodo states that Japanese aircraft carriers
were equipped with enough bomb carts to re-
arm one-third of the carrier’s complement of
dive-bombers at a time. Rearmament occurred
on the flight deck, immediately prior to en-
gine warm-up. Both the Japanese 242 kg
high-explosive bomb and the 250 kg semi-
armor-piercing bomb used the same mount-
ing hardware, speeding the process of
switching between these weapons consider-
ably. Even so, five to six minutes per plane
would be required and would have to be re-
peated three times to arm the entire force, for
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a total of about twenty minutes. To this must
be added the time required to load and move
the ordnance across the flight deck. Hyodo to
Parshall, 7 February and 10 February 2001.
9. This was conducted on the flight deck near
blackboards attached to the side of the island.
10. This included an assistant air officer
(sho-hikocho) visiting each aircraft in the
strike force to ensure that it was running
properly. Hyodo to Parshall, 7 February 2001.
11. The fastest Japanese combat launching on re-
cord to this point in the war had been for
Pearl Harbor, when the carriers launched air-
craft at the rate of one every twenty-eight sec-
onds. Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New
York: Viking Press, 1991), p. 490. ATIG Re-
ports 2, p. 2, and 5, p. 3, cite optimal takeoff
intervals as being ten seconds.
12. As corroboration of this estimate, one need
only look at the operational tempo of the
Pearl Harbor Striking Force six months ear-
lier. During that attack, the Japanese were
able to spot the second wave attack force of
171 aircraft for launch in fifty-five minutes
from when the first attack wave and the for-
mation’s CAP fighters were finished launch-
ing at 0620. In this attack, the six Japanese
carriers were spotting an average of twenty-
eight aircraft per ship, as opposed to the aver-
age twenty-one planes Nagumo’s Midway
force would have spotted. Using the model
we have developed, and adding an additional
seven to ten minutes for extra elevator cycles,
as well as a longer warm-up time in the early
morning air, the figure of fifty-five minutes
agrees well with our estimate. Prange, pp. 490–2.
13. Japan’s official war history series, Boeicho
Boeikenshujo Senshibu (originally Boeicho
Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, and often referred
to in its abbreviated form Senshi sosho [war
history]), was published by Asagumo
Shimbunsha. The Midway volume, Midowei
kaisen [Battle of Midway], published in 1971,
states on page 289, “Provided that the strike
forces were fully equipped, it would have
taken no less than 40 minutes to get them out
of the hangar to the deck and then finish
preparation for launch.” We are grateful to
Nisohachi Hyodo and Takashi Koganemura
for their assistance in these matters.
14. Takeoff from a carrier required using full
military power. Radial aircraft engines were
(and still are) built with very thin cylinder
walls to extremely tight tolerances, and they
required uniform distribution of heat and lu-
bricant to maintain efficient operation. If not
properly warmed up, a radial engine was
likely to blow up outright under full power.
We are grateful to Eric Bergerud and Clint
Bauer for their insights on this crucial issue.
15. It must be remembered that the Japanese op-
erated the aircraft of their carrier groups in a
much more integrated fashion than Western
navies could at this point in the war. Japanese
carrier divisions were trained to combine
like-type squadrons into divisional strike
teams. Thus, during the initial strike against
Midway, the Type 99 dive bombers from
Akagi and Kaga formed a single attack unit,
likewise the Type 97 attack bombers from
Soryu and Hiryu. Consequently, the time re-
quirements of rearming procedures, and cer-
tainly deck-spotting activities, were likely to
be similar among the carriers of a division,
meaning that information concerning a par-
ticular carrier can give us clues as to the state
of its divisional counterpart as well.
16. Reconstructed from “Mobile Force’s Detailed
Battle Report 6,” translated and published in
1947 by the Office of Naval Intelligence as
“The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway,
OPNAV P32-100” (often referred to simply
as the “Nagumo Report”), pp. 13–20, as well
as “Battle Report of Battle of Midway” (ex-
tract translation from document 160985B—
MC 397.901, U.S. Naval Historical Center,
Operational Archives Branch, Washington,
D.C.). All times are given in local (Midway)
time. We are grateful to both John Lundstrom
and Mark Horan for their expertise and assis-
tance in developing a highly detailed and ac-
curate picture of Japanese CAP activities.
17. Ibid. Kaga, as the other big flight deck in
Nagumo’s force, carried an equally large CAP
burden.
18. Any strike force spotted aft would likely have
contained a fighter escort of some sort, re-
quiring Zeros to be brought up from the for-
ward section of the hangars via the forward
elevators, thereby obstructing the flight deck
for takeoffs in any case.
19. The Japanese Type 0 fighter was not con-
strained by range or fuel capacity but rather
by its cannon ammunition. Each Zero carried
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only sixty rounds for each of its two 20 mm
cannons, which constituted the main offen-
sive armament necessary to bring down the
large American attack aircraft. As a result,
Japanese fighters had a tendency to “shoot
their bolt” quickly during combat. The im-
portance of cannon ammunition cannot be
overestimated—Mark Horan, contributor to
A Glorious Page in Our History (Missoula,
Mont.: Pictorial Histories, 1990), has pointed
out to us that casualties among the attacking
American squadrons are strongly correlated
with whether the Japanese fighters they en-
countered carried fresh loads of cannon am-
munition. Japanese doctrine normally called
for two-hour fighter patrols (ATIG Report 2,
p. 2). During the morning’s air battles, at
least seventeen CAP fighters ended their mis-
sions after an hour or less, some after as little
as twenty-six minutes in the air. This evidence
indicates that the Japanese were cycling their
fighters frequently in order to keep them fully
munitioned.
20. Akagi’s strike force was to consist of eighteen
Type 97 (Kate) torpedo bombers and three
Zero fighters. Kaga’s contribution was to be
twenty-six Kates and three Zeros, Soryu’s
eighteen Type 99 (Val) dive-bombers plus
three Zeros, and Hiryu’s eighteen Vals plus
three Zeros.
21. Senshi sosho, Midowei kaisen, pp. 372–8.
22. Best, in an interview with John Lundstrom,
April 2000. Best stated that during the time of
his attack, six to seven aircraft were on the
flight deck, and they were clearly Zeros. Fur-
thermore, Best commented that the Zeros
were using most of the flight deck for run-off
room. As he was attacking, a Zero was in the
process of taking off.
23. Commander Aircraft Battle Force, “Current
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet Air-
craft, vol. 1, Carrier Aircraft,” ser. USF-74,
rev., 20 April 1941.
24. Given the enclosed nature of Japanese han-
gars (which amplified explosive effects upon
the ship’s structure of internal bomb hits),
Japanese carriers with planes in the hangar
were in an even more dangerous position
than if they had planes on the flight deck.
Having no planes aboard when struck was, of
course, optimal.
25. Japanese “Mobile Fleet Doctrine,” promul-
gated 28 March 1944, under “Air Combat,”
paragraph 9, states: “When enemy aircraft
carriers are discovered at close range the
command ‘Send up ‘Q’ ’’ will be given. At
this time every ship will quickly send up the
airplanes standing ready on deck. The
hikokitai [carrier air group] will assemble in
the air and will fly off to the attack organized
in the fixed hikokitai [i.e., standing Table of
Organization].” Translations of these doc-
trinal works, recovered from the sunken
cruiser Nachi in Manila Bay in 1944, are in
the personal collection of David Dickson.
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